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PetSmart, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. (Todd), 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 75 (Dec. 9, 2021)1
PET STORE NOT LIABLE IN TORT ACTION WHEN IT DID NOT ASSUME A DUTY OF
CARE OR HAVE AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH ADOPTION ORGANIZATION
SUMMARY
The Court examined whether a pet store may be held liable where a pet, who later
attacked and injured a person, was adopted at the pet store through an adoption event run by an
independent organization. The Court concluded that PetSmart cannot be held liable, reasoning
that a pet store generally owes no duty to individuals who adopt in such circumstances. The
Court stated that a store may only be held liable if it assumes a duty of care or establishes an
agency relationship with the independent organization. Here, the Court found PetSmart had done
neither. Thus, the Court granted PetSmart’s petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district
court to grant PetSmart’s motion for summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
PetSmart has an adoption program, named PetSmart Charities, that allows independent
animal welfare organizations to set up adoption events for homeless pets at PetSmart stores.
PetSmart vets these independent organizations, called “agency partners,” to ensure that the
agency partners are qualified and have a charitable status. Part of this vetting and qualification
process includes the organizations entering into an agency-partner agreement with PetSmart. The
agreement clarifies that the agency partner is “fully responsible” for the animals it places up for
adoption. The agreement requires persons who adopt an animal from the agency partner to sign
an adoption release form. Thus, PetSmart is aware of adoptions taking place at its stores but does
not cross-reference adoption forms to determine if a pet has been adopted, returned, and readopted. Lastly, the agreement clearly states that no legal partnership or employer-employee
relationship exists between PetSmart and the agency partner.
The adoption at issue in this case involved a large, mixed-breed dog named Chip. Chip
was from an organization called The Animal Foundation (TAF). With TAF, Chip was adopted
twice but returned both times for aggressive behavior. TAF determined that Chip was
unadoptable, but for unknown reasons, Chip ended up with another organization, A Home 4 Spot
(AH4S). AH4S entered into an agency-partner agreement with PetSmart and placed Chip up for
adoption at one of PetSmart’s stores. After two unsuccessful adoptions due to aggressive
behavior that resulted in injuries, AH4S put Chip up for adoption a third time.
Raphaela Todd, an original plaintiff in this matter, adopted Chip. She signed a form that
explained PetSmart was not affiliated with AH4S, thus releasing PetSmart and PetSmart
Charities of liability. Raphaela took Chip home. Later, he attacked James Todd, biting his
forearm and causing deep wounds in James’s arm.
Following this incident, the Todds filed a complaint for negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress against AH4S, TAF, and others. They sued PetSmart under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. PetSmart moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not
liable because it was not involved in Chip’s adoption and exercised no control over Chip.
However, the district court disagreed and found that PetSmart owed a duty to the Todds under
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Wright v. Schum.2 The district court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding an agency relationship between PetSmart and AH4S. Accordingly, PetSmart petitioned
for writ relief. It argued that it did not owe a duty of care to the Todds and had no agency
relationship with AH4S.
DISCUSSION
We exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition
The Court began its discussion with an overview of writs of mandamus. First, it
explained that a writ of mandamus compels the performance of an act when a law requires a duty
or when it is necessary to control an abuse of discretion.3 Second, it noted that a writ of
mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy” that is used when no other simple, efficient, and
adequate remedy is available.4 Third, the Court explained that it has full discretion to entertain
writ petitions,5 even though this type of remedy is uncommon for summary judgment motions.6
The Court stated that it may consider a writ petition if doing so would further judicial economy
and either it is an issue of first impression or there is no factual dispute.7 Here, the Court found
that the requirements were met. Accordingly, it exercised its discretion to entertain the writ
petition.
Standard of review
The Court reviewed the case de novo.8 It noted that whether a defendant owes a duty of
care to a plaintiff is a question of law.9
Whether PetSmart owed a duty of care
PetSmart argued that it did not owe the Todds a duty of care and thus could not be held
liable. It further argued that this case was distinguished from Wright,10 the case the district court
relied on when denying PetSmart summary judgment. The Court began by stating the general
rule that defendants owe no duty of care to control or warn of dangerous conduct of another.11
The Court then turned to Wright and identified a narrow exception in the case: a landlord could
be held liable when he assumed a duty to protect others against a tenant’s aggressive dog.12 The
Court found that this exception did not apply to the current facts because PetSmart did not know
about Chip’s aggressive behavior. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the agency-partner
agreement expressly affirmed that AH4S was fully responsible for the adoptable animals. Thus,
PetSmart did not owe the Todds a duty of care.
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AH4S was not PetSmart’s agent
PetSmart argued that AH4S was not its agent and that the Todds could not have believed
that AH4S was its agent because they signed a form expressly stating that no agency relationship
existed between PetSmart and AH4S. The Todds countered that PetSmart’s conduct made them
view AH4S as an apparent agent. The Court stated that to claim apparent agency in this case the
Todds must prove that they subjectively believed that AH4S had authority to act for PetSmart
and that their subjective belief in AH4S’s authority was objectively reasonable.13 The Court
found that the Todds could not prove this because Raphaela Todd signed a form that stated she
understood that AH4S was not PetSmart’s agent. Therefore, the Court concluded that no genuine
issue of fact existed as to whether AH4S was PetSmart’s agent.
CONCLUSION
The Court held, based on the facts of this case, that “as a pet store typically owes no duty
to the individual in such circumstances, the store can be held liable only if it assumes a duty of
care or has an agency relationship with the charitable organization that conducted the adoption
event. The Court held that PetSmart could not be held liable because it did not assume a duty of
care or have an agency relationship with the charitable organization.
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